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ScienceDirectThe activity of sensory neurons is modulated by non-sensory
influences, but the role of these influences in cognition is only
partially understood. Here we review how the large-scale
recording of neuronal activity within and across brain regions
allows researchers to examine the interactions between
simultaneously recorded neurons as they are jointly influenced
by fluctuations in an animal’s mental state. We focus on studies
on the visual cortex of non-human primates to examine the
relationship between extra-retinal influences and beliefs about
the state of the sensory world. We explore how these influences
can be understood within theoretical frameworks that propose
how the continuous updating of belief states supports
perceptual inference.
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Introduction
It is well known that the responses of neurons in early
visual cortical areas, including the primary visual cortex
(area V1), are affected by factors other than the pattern on
an observer’s retina (e.g. [1–7]). Here we will focus on
these extra-retinal signals because they provide insight
into the interactions between neurons that enable cogni-
tive functions. Similar influences have been observed for
other modalities (e.g. [8]) but we will here focus on the
visual system of the non-human primate. We will refer to
signals as ‘top-down’ if they originate anywhere but thewww.sciencedirect.com ascending pathway of the visual processing hierarchy
preceding the visual area from which neural activity is
recorded. As neural circuits are highly recurrent, a strict
dichotomy of ‘bottom-up’ (feed-forward) and ‘top-down’
(feed-back) signals is simplistic, yet it offers a useful first
approximation of the computational role of different
influences on the responses of sensory neurons. We will
consider the following ‘top-down’ effects: (1) cognitive
influences on the neuronal firing rates in sensory areas, (2)
changes in the structure of correlations between the firing
rates of pairs of neurons and their implications for signals
related to behavioral choice and (3) cognitive influences
on the tuning properties of neurons in sensory areas. We
here review emerging theories based on data that suggest
that these effects fit within a single, unified framework
when it is assumed that ‘top-down’ effects carry infor-
mation about the animal’s beliefs about the stimulus back
to sensory cortex.
Visual neurons are modulated by ‘top-down’
phenomena at precise time-scales
Our insights into the ‘top-down’ influences on sensory
neurons has benefitted enormously from recent advances
in techniques for manufacturing and implanting electrode
arrays. The new methods enable monitoring of large
populations of neurons within and particularly across
brain areas in the behaving animal.
One of the most extensively studied ‘top-down’ signals is
related to the allocation of attention [9–12]. One example
task associated with attention shifts is curve-tracing
([13], Figure 1b). The authors of this study required
monkeys to mentally trace a curve that starts at a fixation
point to determine the endpoint of this curve, because the
circle at the end was the target for an eye movement.
During this task, the neuronal responses in V1 elicited by
a traced line were stronger than those elicited by the
distractor (Figure 1b right). This response modulation
was thought to be caused by the spread of object-based
attention over this curve [14]. Importantly, V1 was only
one of a number of cortical areas where activity was
modulated during the curve-tracing task. It also occurred,
for example, in the frontal eye fields, an area in
frontal cortex involved in planning of eye movements.
The authors then compared the timing of the atten-
tional selection signal between the two areas by com-
puting the latencies of the modulation. Although it is
generally not easy to determine the precise moment of
the onset of the attentional response modulation, the
analysis suggested that the timing of selection of theCurrent Opinion in Neurobiology 2015, 32:45–52
46 Large-scale recording technologyrelevant curve in frontal and visual cortex was similar,
which may indicate that the task calls upon reciprocal
interactions between visual and frontal cortex. Inter-
estingly, the authors found one exception to this sim-
ultaneous selection process. If the monkeys made an
error and chose the wrong curve, the erroneously
selected curve elicited extra activity, both in V1 and
in the frontal eye fields. However, now selection in
frontal cortex preceded selection in visual cortex as if
the frontal cortex imposed its erroneous decision onto
visual cortex [13]. In addition, the authors observed
correlations between frontal and visual cortex that were
strongest for the attended curve. These findings are
compatible with fluctuations of attentional modulation
in both areas that reflect the monkey’s momentary
interpretation of the stimulus and task.
Evidence for fluctuations in attention were also observed
in a study [15] in which monkeys were trained to detect
an orientation change while their attention was cued
toward a stimulus in the left or right visual hemi-field
(Figure 1c). The authors recorded the activity of a popu-
lation of neurons in V4 in both hemispheres and derived a
neuronal measure for how strongly attention was directed
to the left or right, on single trials. These estimates
correlated strongly with how well the monkeys detected
the orientation change in the left or right hemi-field
(Figure 1c, right). Moreover, the value of the neuronal
attention measure varied strongly from trial to trial,
suggesting substantial fluctuations in attention. One
possibility is that these fluctuations reflect random mean-
dering of the mind. An alternative possibility is that they
reflect the continuous updating and adjusting of ‘top-
down’ influences for a computational purpose.
Inference and belief-updating may reveal the
computational role of ‘top-down’ signals
It has long been proposed (e.g. [16–18]) that perception
reflects an inference process in which prior knowledge
about the world is combined with the incoming sensory
evidence to infer the most likely cause of the inputs.
More recent theories have proposed how the required
computations are implemented in neural circuits [19–31].
In these frameworks the response of a visual neuron is
influenced both by the visual stimulus and a ‘top-down’
belief about the visual information available, which is
based on prior knowledge and contextual information
(Figure 2a). This belief is continuously updated based
on additional incoming information. To account for the
observed fluctuations in neuronal activity and attentional
state described above we propose that this updating
occurs on short timescales (during trials or between trials),
but it likely also involves longer time-scales e.g. to reflect
the process of learning novel task contingencies. This
framework can explain a variety of seemingly disparate
‘top-down’ phenomena, some of which we will review
here:Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2015, 32:45–52 Spatial attention, feature-based attention and object-
based attention
Psychophysical and neurophysiological studies have
shown that attention can selectively be directed at a
particular location in space, a particular visual feature
(e.g. motion in a particular direction) or an object to boost
its representation in visual cortex [9–12,32]. One example
is given by the curve-tracing task mentioned above.
According to the inference framework, attentional modu-
lation of neuronal activity can be explained by the belief
that a particular spatial location, feature or object is
relevant for the goal of the animal. Furthermore, in these
types of tasks, the reward contingencies determine what
is relevant and what not, and the framework therefore
might also explain why the modulation of neuronal
activity in visual cortex by rewards resembles the modu-
lation by attention [33,34].
Updating of behavioral relevance
A fundamental assumption of the framework is that
beliefs are updated based on incoming information. What
happens when monkeys have to update their belief about
what is relevant and what not? Khayat et al. [35] used the
curve-tracing task, and unexpectedly switched the iden-
tity of the relevant and irrelevant curve. The change in
relevance caused an early increase in the activity elicited
by newly relevant curve, followed by a decrease in
activity for the curve that lost relevance, compatible with
the view that this modulation of neuronal activity reflects
the updated belief about the relevance of the respective
curve. Neuronal modulation has also been observed
during tasks that demand a sequence of cognitive steps,
again compatible with rapid updating of beliefs. In one
example experiment [36] monkeys had to trace a curve
to identify the color of a marker at the end of the curve,
and to then carry out a visual search for another disk with
the same color. The successive increases in neuronal
activity evoked by the task relevant items may reflect
the monkey’s progression in solving the task. The
modulation of neuronal activity in these and other tasks
that involved switching the relevant target [37,38]
occurred at timescales of tens to hundreds of millise-
conds, suggesting that beliefs about relevance can
change on fast time-scales.
Task-dependent modulation of correlations between
neurons
Sensory neurons respond variably to repeated presenta-
tions of an identical stimulus, and a component of this
variability is typically shared between neurons. These
interneuronal correlations are often referred to as ‘noise-
correlations’ [39] as they occur in response to an identical
stimulus, to differentiate them from ‘signal correlations’
that are caused by the similarity between the tunings of
different neurons. While originally viewed as merely
resulting from noise in divergent sensory afferents, more
recent work has shown that these (noise) correlationswww.sciencedirect.com
Belief states in the visual cortex Nienborg and Roelfsema 47
Figure 1
T
DT
D
V1
Sp
ike
s/
s
N
or
m
. R
es
p.
Time (ms)
40
  30
  20
  10
0
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
co
rre
ct
1 Left changes
Right changes
Mean % correct0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
n
u
m
be
r o
f n
eu
ro
ns
40
n=82
20
0
choice probability
0.2 0.5 0.8
0
–2 –1.5 –1 –0.5 0
Projection
0.5 1 1. 2
TT
DD
V1 FEF
V4
V1
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
V4
FEF
–100 0 200 400
Time (ms)
–100 0 200 400
Current Opinion in Neurobiology
Example tasks associated with extra-retinal influences on activity in the visual cortex. (a) Lateral view of the brain of the macaque monkey. (b)
Simultaneous recordings in V1 (48 contacts) and FEF (single electrodes) for a curve tracing task where monkeys had to mentally trace a target
curve (T) while maintaining gaze on a small (red) fixation point. The animals had to ignore the distractor (D). Neuronal responses in V1 and the
frontal eye fields (FEF) elicited by the target curve (red curve) were stronger than responses elicited by a distractor (blue). The green square in the
left panels illustrates the location of a receptive field in V1; the green ellipse denotes a receptive field in FEF. Reproduced with permission from
[13]. (c) Simultaneous recordings in left and right V4 (2  48 contacts) while monkeys had to detect small changes in the orientation in a stream
of successively presented pairs of grating stimuli. The monkeys were rewarded for making a saccade to the stimulus that changed while attention
was cued to the left or right stimulus. The authors derived a measure based on the activity of a population of neurons for the amount of attention
directed to the left or right stimulus on a single trial. The panel illustrates the accuracy (y-axis) for detecting changes in the left (dashed line) and
right grating (continuous line) as function of the single trial attention measure (called projection; x-axis). This attention measure predicted the
animals’ ability to detect changes in the left or right grating. Reproduced with permission from [15]. (d) Recordings in V1 using linear arrays (8 or
24 contacts) or single electrodes during an orientation discrimination task with stimuli composed of orientation band-pass filtered noise. The
monkeys had to choose between one of two orthogonal orientations. The right panel illustrates the distribution of choice-probabilities, with a mean
that was significantly larger than 0.5. For example, if neurons tuned to vertical were more active, the monkey was more likely to choose the
vertical orientation. Thus, V1 neurons carried signals related to the animal’s choice.Reproduced with permission from [53].
www.sciencedirect.com Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2015, 32:45–52
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The mental state of an animal can be characterized as a succession of belief states. (a) Sensory input is represented by sensory neurons
and influences the belief through feedforward pathways. Sensory neurons, in turn, receive feedback from neurons representing the
animal’s belief about the sensory stimulus. (b) Belief states can account for the influence of the animal’s choices on the activity of
sensory neurons. Left, in an orientation discrimination task, the monkey’s belief (e.g. its expectation about the stimulus or its decision
about the stimulus) that the stimulus is vertical enhances the activity of sensory neurons coding for vertical. These top-down influences
may be related to shifts in feature-attention. Right, in a curve-tracing task, the belief that one of the two curves is relevant causes
enhanced activity for neurons that represent its contour elements. These top-down effects are likely related to shifts of object-based
attention.depend on cognitive factors such as attention [40],
learning [41], task [42], and also on anesthetic state
[43]. In an elegant study, Cohen and Newsome [42]
required monkeys to discriminate between the direction
of motion along two different axes (e.g. up-down or left-
right). They observed that the relevant motion axis
influenced the pattern of noise correlations in motion-
sensitive area MT. When the axis was such that the
pair of neurons supported the same decision, the noise
correlation was stronger than when the axis was such
that they supported different decisions. Thus, the
noise-correlations depended on the animal’s task. UsingCurrent Opinion in Neurobiology 2015, 32:45–52 simulations, the authors could explain this finding with a
component of feature selective attention that fluctuated
from trial to trial. This explanation is in accordance with
the idea of fluctuating belief states (Figure 2a). Suppose
that the animal has to discriminate between up and
down. Now the belief will fluctuate between the upward
and downward direction. These influences would induce
a positive correlation between neurons that support the
same decision along the up-down axes, but negative
correlations between neurons that support opposite de-
cisions along this axis. However, if the monkey discrimi-
nates between left and right directions, fluctuations inwww.sciencedirect.com
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lation along the left-right axis, similar to the pattern
observed in MT. A recent theoretical proposal combined
Bayesian inference with neural sampling [22,44,45] and
produced exactly these results [46].
Such an effect on noise correlations also has implications
on trial-by-trial correlations between neural activity and
perceptual decisions in discrimination tasks, which may
therefore be accounted for in the same framework. These
correlations are frequently referred to as ‘choice-prob-
abilities’ and occur in many perceptual tasks and in many
visual areas [47–52]. Figure 1d shows recent results of a
study reporting choice probabilities in V1 for an orien-
tation discrimination task [53]. The animal’s task was to
discriminate between two orientations 90 degrees apart in
a noisy stimulus (orientation bandpass filtered noise).
Choice probabilities quantify the correlation between
neural activity and the animal’s choices. A choice-prob-
ability of 0.5 indicates no relation between neuronal
activity and choice while values >0.5 indicate a positive
correlation. The mean choice probability across the popu-
lation of V1 neurons was slightly above 0.5 indicating a
weak but systematic relationship between the neural
activity and behavior (Figure 1d, right). Theoretical
[54,55] and empirical [56,57] findings show a close
relationship between noise correlations and choice-prob-
abilities. Let us reconsider the fluctuations in feature
selective attention mentioned above, which may reflect
the variations in the animal’s belief. Suppose that on
some trials the animal attends more to vertical and on
others more to horizontal orientations, and that this
modulation in feature selective attention affects
neuronal responses. These fluctuations would therefore
result in correlations among neurons preferring vertical
or horizontal orientations, respectively (Figure 2b, left).
It is plausible that these fluctuations in feature selective
attention are also systematically associated with choice:
when the animal attends to vertical (e.g. because it
expects the next stimulus to be vertical) it is also more
likely to respond that a noisy stimulus is vertical. On
trials when the animal attends more to vertical this
would increase the probability of the animal choosing
the vertical target and boost the responses of a neuron
preferring vertical orientations, thus result in a choice
probability larger than 0.5 [58]. Such an expectation
resulting from the previous stimulus (and the choice
given) could also explain recent findings that an animal’s
choice on a preceding trial correlates with the activity of
visual neurons on the current trial [59]. A similar expla-
nation can be given for ‘top-down’ effects in the curve-
tracing task (Figure 2b, right). Erroneous beliefs about
the identity of the target curve are reflected by neurons
in frontal cortex, which may feed back to enhance
activity of visual neurons whose receptive fields overlap
with the erroneously selected curve, and give rise to
significant choice-related modulation [60].www.sciencedirect.com Receptive field shifts in V1 which may underlie a size
illusion
Visual cues about perspective to generate a 3D impres-
sion of a scene influence judgments about the size of an
object [61]: an object for which the perspective cues
suggest it is further away is perceived as larger than an
object of the same size that seems closer. In a recent study
[62] monkeys were trained on a size discrimination task
in the presence or absence of perspective cues. The
monkeys showed the same behavior as human subjects,
judging the object that appeared further away to be larger.
When recording the responses of V1 neurons in these
animals the authors observed that in the presence of the
perspective cues the receptive fields of the neurons were
shifted systematically in a way that could support this size
illusion. The authors suggested that these shifts reflected
‘top-down’ influences based on the perspective context
that differed from previous findings of modulation by
attention. For the inference framework this suggests that
beliefs can exert rather complex influences on the
responses of visual neurons depending on the prior or
contextual information.
Large-scale recordings are ideal to study
‘top-down’ phenomena as they open many
windows simultaneously into the same mental
state
While the control of the visual input allows experimenters
to directly manipulate and explore visually driven
responses of cortical neurons, the control of ‘top-down’
influences is indirect. It typically requires behavioral
manipulations to systematically generate a mental state,
e.g. an expectation that a stimulus will appear in the right
half of the visual field, to measure the ‘top-down’ signals
associated with this mental state. Because mental states
fluctuate even when the same tasks are performed [15]
control of these ‘top-down’ signals is less precise and
repeatable than that of the visual input. Large-scale
recordings offer a solution to this problem since all
simultaneously recorded neurons are influenced by the
same mental state. Simultaneous recordings from
neuronal populations also allow for measurements of
correlations between neurons, in the same or in different
areas, which are crucial for an understanding of how the
information available in visual neurons is used during
perception.
New probes have also been developed that enable the
recordings from the different layers of a cortical area, an
approach used by (e.g. [63]). Monkeys had to detect
figures defined by textures. When the figure was centered
on the receptive field of a V1 neuron its responses were
enhanced compared to when the same texture was pre-
sented inside the receptive field but was part of the
background. At the boundary between a figure and the
background, this extra activity occurred relatively early
and it was largely stimulus driven [64], i.e. it could beCurrent Opinion in Neurobiology 2015, 32:45–52
50 Large-scale recording technologyexplained by orientation-tuned surround influences [65].
However, the extra-activity in the center of the figure
did not occur if the monkey failed to perceive the figure
[66] and was more pronounced if the animal directed
attention to the figure [64]. This suggests that it reflected
the monkey’s belief about stimulus presence as well as
its relevance. The advantage of the linear arrays is that
they span the cortical thickness enabling a comparison
of activity across the cortical layers. Interestingly, the
response modulation was strongest in the superficial
and deep layers and weaker in layer 4. The superficial
and deep layers are the main targets of feed-back con-
nections [67,68], suggesting that the modulation was
likely to be mediated by feedback.
Conclusion
One of the major challenges of contemporary neuro-
science is to understand how visual cortex and other brain
areas interact to construct an interpretation of the visual
world and select the visual information that is relevant for
behavioral goals. Here we have reviewed recent neuro-
physiological evidence for ‘top-down’ effects in the con-
text of theories about belief states. These belief states
could emerge from interactions between the sensory
cortices and other brain regions with the sensory areas
providing input for the more categorical representations
in higher areas [69], and for the representation of beha-
vioral — and emotional — relevance in other cortical and
subcortical structures. These areas in turn provide feed-
back to influence activity in sensory cortices. An
interpretation of these interactions as resulting from
belief states provides a computational framework that
may unify the task-related influences on firing rates
and tuning properties in the sensory areas, the patterns
of noise-correlations and their consequences for choice-
related activity. We anticipate that the further develop-
ment of technologies for the simultaneous recordings of
neuronal activity within and particularly across brain
regions will pave the way for testing predictions about
belief states, as well as other ideas on how neurons in
different areas coordinate their activity for the emergence
of cognitive functions.
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